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The Factory as (Temporary) Refuge
On the afternoon of August 2, 2014, I walked into Hossain Market, one of the
many nondescript multistoried buildings lining the commercial thoroughfare in
Uttor Badda, Dhaka. I had gone to show solidarity with hunger-striking garment
workers of the Toba Group, three of whose units were housed in the building.
Since July 28, several hundred workers had occupied the upper ﬂoors, demand-
ing payment of three months back wages, overtime, and a festival bonus. The
market entrance looked deserted, not exactly the hotbed of industrial action
I’d expected. “Is this where the strike is?” I asked no one in particular. A
couple of young women immediately escorted me up several ﬂights of stairs –
past the inevitable collapsible gates and oversized padlocks adorning each
ﬂoor. On the seventh ﬂoor landing, young student volunteers were buzzing
around a media and communications desk they had set up. Inside, I found
half a dozen workers sprawled across cutting tables and makeshift beds, being
administered saline by a medical team provided by a well-known health rights
NGO. Hundreds of others, mostly women but also some men, milled across
the room. Before I could speak to the workers, Shahidul Islam Shabuj, a
labor organizer and sometime acquaintance, spied me from a distance and
whisked me away to the top ﬂoor for an audience with Moshrefa Mishu, presi-
dent of the Garment Workers Unity Forum and the prime mover behind the
“fast unto death.” For Shabuj, my presence was fortuitous—an opportunity to
get the workers’ formal message out.
Upstairs, inside the managing director’s ofﬁce, a slew of younger female
labor leaders, as well as a young mofussil lawyer, had come to “pay their re-
spects” to Mishu and show support for the strike. They came forward, ritually
handing over their business cards, eager to be acknowledged (or perhaps
blessed) by the veteran Left organizer. The symbolic occupation of the MD’s
ofﬁce by Mishu and her co-organizers seemed only to add to their sense of
awe. As we waited for Mishu to speak, a conﬁdent young woman introduced
herself to me. I had last seen Lovely Yeasmin when she was the slightly hesitant
teenaged coordinator of the Bangladesh Independent GarmentWorkers’Union
Federation (BIGUF), an AFL-CIO supported group to which she no longer
belongs.
Mishu told her story with a quiet resolve, with occasional enthusiastic
interjections from two young male workers in their early twenties. The staff of
ﬁve factories owned by the Toba Group—1,600 workers—had not been paid,
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ostensibly because a co-owner, Delwar Hossain, was in jail. Hossain had been
the managing director of Tazreen fashions; he was facing charges related to
the deadly ﬁre that had killed more than 100 workers in November 2012.
Despite his imprisonment since February, the Toba group secured a major con-
tract to supply ofﬁcially licensed jerseys for the World Cup games in Brazil.
Indeed, the Brazil contract was widely publicized and a source of considerable na-
tionalist pride—for many middle-class Bangladeshis, this represented participa-
tion in a glamorous sporting event otherwise closed to the nation. In contrast,
for the two male sewing operators in that room, (the memory of producing)
those jerseys appeared to be literal, material signiﬁers of their deprivations and
grievances—an invisible measure of the distance between the purported plea-
sures of world-class football and their own micro-struggles on the shop ﬂoor.
They “gifted” me packaging left over from the WC order, as well as Xeroxes
of the company’s most recent ﬁnancial statements: “proof” of their embodied
labor and the owners’ prevarications about proﬁts and ability to pay.
The Toba story sounded depressingly familiar in its outlines, for
Bangladeshi garment factories are notorious for not paying workers on time.
Two factors stood out: ﬁrst, the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and
Employers’ Association (BGMEA), the inﬂuential self-regulating trade body,
was directly involved from the outset in negotiating back wages. Toba
workers had earlier gheraoed (encircled) the gleaming BGMEA headquarters
demanding arrears, to no avail. Workers had also received written and oral as-
surances they would be paid by Eid. Second, several registered unions, estab-
lished in the wake of the amended labor law of 2013, represented the workers
in what turned out to be failed negotiations. In an absurd twist, Delwar
Hossain received bail just before Eid. Bail was granted with full government
blessings, on the grounds that this would hasten worker payments.
The trope of starvation—of bodily deprivation—marked worker narra-
tives that afternoon. The night before the Eid holidays, once it was clear the
BGMEA would once again renege on its promise to pay, the decision to fast
made “bodily sense” to the organizers. Not being paid for three months
meant workers were already, irredeemably, malnourished as they rushed,
working overtime, to complete orders before the World Cup began. From
that perspective, the hunger strike was not a desperate gambit. It merely for-
malized and rendered more meaningful the structural violence that shaped ev-
eryday living. To declare a hunger strike—amoron anoshon—was to make
visible, re-center, and so transform the meanings of the quotidian practices
of otherwise marginal subjects. If they were going to starve, I was told, they
might as well starve for justice.
Of the many things Mishu spoke of that afternoon, her insistence that the
factory was the safest place for these unpaid workers struck me the most force-
fully. Such a claim sounded counterintuitive, if not preposterous, given the safety
record of Bangladeshi factories. But three months of arrears meant three
months of unpaid rent, piling store credits, and school fees. A well-founded
fear of harassment by landlords and other creditors prevented workers from
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returning home that night before Eid; journeying to their village homes to
escape or to celebrate the holidays was not an option because of the costs in-
volved. Given the circumstances, the factory provided the desperate workers
with the only refuge they had. “They are here, protecting their machines,
because the machines are their livelihood,” said Mishu. The machines, she
wanted to say, were in safe custody.
The hunger strike caught the imagination of the public in a way other,
earlier industrial actions had not. The Toba Group Sramik Songram
Committee, an alliance of eleven Left-leaning organizations, held a series of
sit-ins in front of Hossain Market; women’s groups and “civil society” represen-
tatives organized press conferences and protests. For a ﬂeeting moment, this
seemed to be a turning point in labor activism in the country. The images
coming out of this strike were nothing like the standard gendered representa-
tions of worker protests in the popular media. This was not a “rampaging
mob” of dissatisﬁed male workers bent on vandalizing the means of production
on which they depended, but mothers with young children and brothers with
families to support, desperately demanding their paona or dues.
Just days later, the “deep state”1 swung into action. More accurately, the
alliance of state and capital, always intimate, reached a new and more transpar-
ent level. Police—in conjunction with “local goons”—cordoned off Hossain
Market and barred all entry into the premises. Over the course of several
hours, they forced medical and other personnel to leave, locking workers in.
At one stage, the authorities refused to let in urgent medical supplies, leaving
hunger strikers in a highly vulnerable situation. Female police ofﬁcers in formal
regalia—batons, shields, and helmets—along with male henchmen alleged to
belong to the ruling party, brutally beat up workers and others present, including
a female university professor and a number of Left activists. Moshrefa Mishu and
others were brieﬂy arrested. The BGMEA announced it would pay two months’
salary immediately and the remainder within a week. Workers’ representatives
refused the offer; eventually, most workers were compelled to collect what
wages they could.
The violent storming of the hunger strike at Hossain Market did not garner
widespread media coverage globally. Yet the unfolding of events during the
hunger strike, I suggest, offers valuable insights into the state of labor organizing
and workers’ rights in the wake of the Rana Plaza disaster and the global atten-
tion lavished on the Bangladeshi garment industry since then.
Rana Plaza: A Twenty-ﬁrst Century Triangle Shirtwaist Disaster?
The collapse of Rana Plaza on April 24, 2013 in Savar, Bangladesh in which
more than 1,100 workers were killed, numerous others maimed for life, and
the livelihoods of several thousand workers destroyed, catapulted the modern
“sweatshop” into global headlines. The worst industrial disaster in the history
of the global garment industry, Rana Plaza opened up debates on responsibility
and accountability in transnational production processes.
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From the outset, the desire to read the Rana Plaza collapse, coming on the
heels of the Tazreen ﬁre, as a watershed moment, a game-changer, and catalyst
along the lines of the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire of 1911, has been strong.
Comparisons to the 1911 incident seemed to come almost naturally.2 Scenes of
young, mostly female workers, locked inside factory premises, jumping to their
deaths in a desperate bid to save their lives cannot but recall an earlier
“tragedy” in the history of the garment industry. Despite the visual similarities
generated by combining the Tazreen ﬁre deaths with the Rana Plaza collapse,
the analogy is counterproductive, if not dangerous.
The global economy in whichNewYork factories were embedded in the early
1900s was quite different from the conditions that enabled Dhaka’s garment facto-
ries to ﬂourish a century later. The aftermath of the Triangle Shirtwaist Fire was a
domestic localized process—one that took place within a broader environment of
socialist radicalism. It bears recalling that this was not only a moment of great
ferment in the grassroots labor movement in the United States but also one in
which questions of the rights of labor versus capital were at the forefront of nation-
al and international debates.
The stakes for striking or demanding regulation were equally high but they
were different and contained ﬁrmly within national borders. In the intervening
years, with the rise of the so-called global factory and the search for lower labor
costs internationally, the scale of the commodity chain has become much more
complex. Multiple transnational actors are now involved in the garment indus-
try, all operating in a decidedly neoliberal discursive environment. The many
layers of globalized subcontracting, the incorporation of local petty commodity
production and home-based workers as well as factory workers across national
boundaries, and new networks between producers and consumers, render any
easy comparisons moot. The “sweatshop” itself has become a rejuvenated site
of transnational activism, alliances, and solidarity among groups as diverse as
university students, fashion models, and consumers, as well as workers’ rights
organizations.3
Questions of accountability and responsibility, of “reform,” have been ren-
dered correspondingly complex. Today, changes in capitalist production pro-
cesses and the mediatization of everyday social landscapes inform decisions
by factory owners, Euro-American buyers, Southern governments, workers,
and transnational labor activists.4
Finally, a literal comparisonbetween twoevents separatedbya centuryhas the
effect of placing Bangladesh in an economic past that the US appears to have, by
implication, experienced and moved beyond. This evolutionary, stagist and
Orientalizing framingdenies coevalness; it suggests theBangladeshi garment indus-
try and itsworkersarebackwardand lessmature, literallyoutof time. In theprocess,
the global capitalist system inwhich the industry is embedded is effectively depolit-
icized. Industrial disasters and subsequent legal reform can be recast as a necessary
phase in capitalist growth, one that more “mature” economies have traversed and
left behind. The foundational violence of capitalism can simply be disavowed.
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It may be stating the obvious, but any report “from the ﬁeld” must be con-
textualized; in this case, through a close analysis of the global economy in which
Bangladeshi garment workers’ lives are intimately entangled—the transnational
connections and conjunctures, as well as the driving narratives through which we
understand the events in question.
The Ethical Global Gaze
Whatever its long term consequences, in the immediate aftermath of the
Rana Plaza incident, public debates in the global North turned ﬁrmly on
questions of ethical sourcing, transparency, and accountability in the produc-
tion chain. Among other things, recalibrating the reputation of Euro-
American retailers became an urgent task. Just three weeks after the Rana
Plaza collapse, a number of (primarily European) retailers signed the
Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh. Hailed by many around
the world as a signiﬁcant turning point in the struggle for labor rights, the
Accord calls for independent inspection and remediation of Bangladeshi
manufacturing units used by its signatories for a period of ﬁve years. With
nearly 150 retailers and brands signed up, the Accord builds on the
Bangladesh government’s National Action Plan on Fire Safety and “wel-
comes a strong role” for the International Labor Organization (ILO). The
legally binding nature of the ﬁnancial and other commitments of the
Accord is said to have prompted US retailers such as Gap and Walmart to
put together a competing agreement, the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker
Safety, in July 2013. Both the Accord and the Alliance have the mandate
to recommend closure of factories deemed unsafe, until appropriate repairs
are undertaken.
The differences between the Accord and the Alliance have been parsed at
length by US-based activists and academics, who overwhelming tend to privilege
the former. In April 2014, the Stern Center for Business and Human Rights at
NYU issued a report entitled Business as Usual is Not an Option: Supply Chains
and Sourcing after Rana Plaza. The Stern report raised a ﬁrestorm primarily for
minimizing Accord/Alliance differences, for its apparent bias toward retailers,
and for misstatements on key provisions of the Accord. The global union
IndustriAll, a signatory to the Accord, responded with a critique. A coalition
of over 100 US-based academics signed an open letter to the authors of the
Stern report.
It is worth asking why a report produced by a US business school should
generate this kind of response. What are the circuits through which a report
like this travels? What kind of power does this attention index? Inside
Bangladesh, few people are aware of the Stern School initiative. In fact, there
are hardly any debates on the merits of the Accord and the Alliance.
On the contrary, some voices on the Left express discomfort with the emer-
gence and supranational power of international private sector inspection bodies
operating with evident ease in a supposedly sovereign nation state. “What are
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the implications of US and European retailers having the power to close down
factories they deem unsafe? To whom are they accountable?” asks Taslima
Akter, award-winning photographer and coordinator of the labor advocacy
group, Garments Sromik Shonghoti. Nazneen Shifa, a member of the Activist
Anthropologists—a group working with survivors of Tazreen and Rana Plaza,
is similarly wary. Other progressive voices insist the emphasis on the global pro-
duction chain masks both the enormous proﬁts and the culpability of
Bangladeshi factory owners. In this view, a Walmart or Primark is not nearly
as culpable as factory owners who have made millions from the sweat of
garment workers. Such are the paradoxes of transnational positionality.
To date the Accord-Alliance combine has inspected over 1,100 factories.
Ten have been fully closed down. Resistance has come from predictable
sources—factory owners—as well from workers themselves. The Accord
legally binds brands to ensure that workers are paid during factory closures.
However, according to a spokesperson for IndustriAll, “the detail on who
would make payments had been left open in order to ensure that all those
factory owners who could afford to pay for repairs and compensation for
workers made the necessary contribution.”5 While such details are negotiated,
workers in factories declared unsafe pay a different price. “Starvation through
unemployment or the danger of death, this is not a choice” is how workers
laid off from factories closed down by Accord/Alliance inspectors, voice their
dilemma.6
Between the Spectacular and the Everyday
The Stern School report may well gloss over crucial differences between the
Accord and the Alliance. Yet, albeit inadvertently, Business as Usual points to
the limits of the Alliance/Accord mandate. The report maps out in considerable
detail the global production chain for the kind of cheap garments produced in
Bangladesh, thereby highlighting the relationship between sourcing practices
based on the demand for “fast fashion” and coercive labor practices on the shop
ﬂoor. Read against the grain, the report gives a good sense of how the spectacular
(the collapse of Rana Plaza) is intimately tied to the everyday (extremely short lead
times, the compulsion to work against one’s better judgment, a ﬁnancial structure in
which payment is invariably outstanding, the threat to withhold payment) and how
the latter has as much to do with the deaths of Rana Plaza as faulty infrastructure.
To say that impossibly short lead times enable conditions of coercion is not to
absolve factory owners and managers of responsibility, of course.
The Rana Plaza incident recalls and complicates Melissa Wright’s analysis
of the apparel export industry along the Mexican-American border and in
China.7 Wright unpacks the processes through which the myth of essentially
disposable Third World women’s labor and bodies are produced. Arguably,
Bangladeshi workers’ bodies are rendered into “waste” in the process of
contemporary capital accumulation. I would venture to suggest, however,
that in the emergent hypermediatized discourse of ethical production and
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consumption today, there is no place for visibly disposable bodies. The deaths
at Rana Plaza and Tazreen Fashions were unacceptable precisely for making
visible the violent underbelly of transnational capital and rendering legible
the violence that binds consuming bodies in the Global North with producing
bodies in places like Bangladesh.
International Labor Solidarity or Neoliberal Transnational Organizing?
Brief Notes on the Search for Authenticity
A key difference between the Accord and the Alliance is that the former in-
cludes national and international unions. The agreement stipulates that
workers are to be included in inspections and have the right to refuse to
unsafe work. Notwithstanding this important provision, the conditions that
generated the Toba Group strike were simply beyond the Accord-Alliance
mandate. In fact, in the eyes of striking Toba workers, the four registered
unions and their ﬂamboyant labor leader, Nazma Akter (no relation to
Kalpona), who had negotiated on their behalf, did not simply lose credibility.
For them, the failed talks revealed Nazma’s true status—as a dalal or agent of
the BGMEA.
Who speaks for Bangladeshi garment workers? This fraught question does
not lend itself to deﬁnitive answers. Amendments to the labor law and the
signing of the Accord produced important changes. According to an ILO
report from February 2014, ninety-six new trade unions had been registered
in the garment sector in 2013 alone, bringing the total number of registered
unions to 222.8 A large number of these recently registered unions are afﬁliated
with the Washington, DC-based, AFL-CIO-supported Solidarity Center. The
actual power of these new factory based trade unions has yet to be determined.
It would be incorrect to assume, however, that labor organizing was absent
before the emergence of the Accord and various global pressures on the govern-
ment of Bangladesh. Numerous federations have long vied for inﬂuence in the
garment sector, although contemporary global narratives minimized their
signiﬁcance. Local progressive intellectuals often dismiss the federations as
too politicized to count as “real” unions.
From one perspective, supporting the Accord is fundamental to supporting
workers’ rights in Bangladesh. A key difference between the Accord and the
Alliance is that the former includes national and international unions. The
agreement stipulates that workers are to be included in inspections and have
the right to refuse unsafe work. Notwithstanding this important provision, the
conditions that generated the Toba Group strike were simply beyond the
Accord-Alliance mandate. In fact, in the eyes of striking Toba workers, the
four registered unions and their ﬂamboyant labor leader, Nazma Akter (no re-
lation to Kalpona), who had negotiated presumably in good faith on their
behalf, did not simply lose credibility. For them, the failed talks revealed
Nazma’s true status—as a dalal or agent of the BGMEA.9
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A new class of (sometimes reluctant) cosmopolitan labor organizers has
emerged in line with the advocacy and lobbying requirements of contemporary
transnational production chains.10 Their work articulates directly to a speciﬁc
global circuit in which Bangladeshi worker interests are transnationalized.
The NGO Bangladesh Center for Worker Solidarity (BCWS), and its charismatic
Executive Director KalponaAkhter, is among the best known. A former garment
worker, Kalpona is an articulate spokesperson for Bangladeshi workers’ rights.
The unsolved 2012 murder of Kalpona’s colleague, Aminul Islam, widely report-
ed in the global press appeared to signal the dangers of organizing in the garment
industry.11 Kalpona, who speaks ﬂuent English, is a frequent traveler to the
United States, where most recently she testiﬁed to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on labor rights (in relation to the 2013 US suspension of
Generalized Special Preferences to the country).
Members of the Activists Anthropologists group, a loose coalition of aca-
demics concerned with social justice, consciously operate at a remove from
such transnational circuits. That is, they refuse on principle to involve them-
selves in international connections that they feel either compromise national
economic sovereignty or lead to complicity with capitalist structures of domina-
tion. In the last few years, they have worked directly with survivors (and their
families) of Tazreen and Rana Plaza. Often dogged in their pursuit of justice,
they have organized some of the most creative forms of resistance to capital (in-
cluding ﬂash mobs and a “die-in,” a literal invasion of the space of the BGMEA,
its glittering multistory headquarters). Taslima Akter, whose haunting photo-
graph of an embracing couple in the ruins of Rana Plaza became iconic of the
event, is a longtime Left activist who has set up a solidarity organization for
garment workers. Both the Activist Anthropologists and Taslima Akter view
the “Nazma Akters” of the world with profound suspicion.
To ask where international labor solidarity ends and neoliberal transna-
tional governmentality begins may be to miss the point. The Rana Plaza collapse
has enabled the emergence of new niches for labor activism and advocacy. In the
spaces that have opened up, multiple actors jostle to represent the authentic
voice or interest of the garment worker, usually working within a spectrum of
established ideological repertoires. The question of what it takes to represent
workers remains open.
What of the workers at the Toba Group who risked so much for the right to
be paid for labor/value that had already been extracted from their bodies?
Moshrefa Mishu is back on the streets demanding justice for Toba workers,
who are still owed one full month’s wage and a bonus. Those who survived
Tazreen and Rana Plaza are still awaiting compensation.
NOTES
1. Here I use “deep state” as a “short hand for the embedded anti-democratic power struc-
tures within a government,” irrespective of what party is in power. See “What is the Deep
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State?” in On Religion, July 4, 2013. http://www.onreligion.co.uk/what-is-the-deep-state/.
Accessed June 3, 2015.
2. Thus, on the 2014 anniversary of the Triangle Shirtwaist Fire, Hunter College organized
a forum entitled From Triangle Shirtwaist to Bangladesh: The Garment Industry, Tragedy and
Workplace Safety Reform at which I was asked to speak. The event, which brought together
US labor historians as well as activists, was productive and revealing. It proved to be difﬁcult
to transcend the implicitly evolutionary framing inscribed in the terms of debate. The conver-
sation is online. [http://www.roosevelthouse.hunter.cuny.edu/events/triangle-shirtwaist-bangladesh-
garment-industry-tragedy-workplace-safety-reform/ (accessed 6/22/2015)]Roosevelt House,
Hunter College, CUNY. New York, March 25.
3. In this regard, the schedule laid out for Bangladeshi labor organizer Kalpana Akter, on
a tour of the US, last October, is instructive. In the course of one week, Ms. Akter traveled to
Walmart’s headquarters to address their Board, lectured at a conference in NewYork organized
by South Asian leftists, consulted with fashion models eager to promote ethical sourcing during
New York’s fashion week, and picketed GAP stores in the city.
4. For an analysis of how the retailer American Apparel used the Rana Plaza collapse to
promote its Made in the USA clothing label, see Dina M Siddiqi “Solidarity, Sexuality and
Saving Muslim Women in Neoliberal Times” in Women’s Studies Quarterly Vol 42, No. 3–4,
Fall/Winter 2014.
5. Sarah Butler, “Bangladesh factory owners threaten inspection agencies with legal
action.” The Guardian, May 26, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/26/
bangladesh-clothing-factory-safety-agreement-compensation-closures (accessed 1/13/2015)
6. Taslima Akter, personal communication.
7. Melissa W. Wright Disposable Women and Other Myths of Global Capitalism.
Routledge, 2006.
8. International Labour Organization. Union Registrations Rise Sharply in Bangladesh:
New Labor Laws Pave Way to Improve Conditions, Workers’ Rights. http://www.ilo.org/dhaka/
Informationresources/Publicinformation/Pressreleases/WCMS_236042/lang–en/index.htm (accessed
1/13/2015).
9. This is an ironic position for Nazma Akhter to inhabit today. Along with Lovely
Yeasmin, she was a leading member of BIGUF when it was ﬁrst set up in the early 1990s.
Like Yeasmin, she too left to start her own organization, the Awaaj Foundation. At the time,
she told me she was frustrated with BIGUF priorities which she felt were set by people in
Washington, not by the needs of workers in Bangladesh. For more on Nazma Akhter, see
Dina M Siddiqi, “Do Bangladesh Sweatshop Workers Need Saving? Sisterhood in the Post-
Sweatshop Era.” Feminist Review 91, 2009:154–174. Indeed, unlike most other federations,
BIGUF does not support pressing for duty free access of Bangladeshi garments to the US,
for instance.
10. The United States has turned out to be an unexpected site of ethnographic observation
of the garment industry in Bangladesh. In the last two years, I have attended and spent time
with Nazma Akter at a two day long workshop on the future of the garment industry at New
York University’s Stern School of Business, found myself translating for the current president
of BIGUF, Namita Nath, at a Washington DC event organized by the International Labor
Rights Forum, interviewed Kalpona Akhter during a lunch break at a New York conference
to which she had been ﬂown in by the South Asia Solidarity Initiative (SASI) and listened to
survivors of Rana Plaza promoting the Accord at a Students Against Sweatshops event at
New York University.
11. Trade unionists routinely face physical intimidation and legal harassment through
being charged with false cases. The BCWS has even had its license temporarily revoked by
the NGO bureau. However, the abduction of Aminul Islam was somewhat unusual and
perhaps reﬂected the political environment of the time, in which extrajudicial killings and dis-
appearance of political rivals was routine.
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